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Eugene D. Genovese: 
The Mind of a Marxist Conservative 
 
Manisha Sinha 
 
 
Few historians have left their mark on a field as decisively as Eugene D. Genovese. 
The shape of southern history, particularly slavery studies, would look rather 
differ- ent without his substantial corpus. Debates in southern history 
continue to be framed around the issues first raised or developed by Genovese 
in his early work on the Old South and slavery. More than any other historian of 
slavery, he has set the agenda for antebellum southern historiography and bears 
responsibility for both its strengths and its limitations. Writing from the 
standpoint of an odd ideological con- juncture — as a self-professed Marxist and 
an unabashed admirer of southern slave- holders— Genovese’s Janus-faced 
political loyalties, to use a metaphor he himself has employed, have shaped 
his work. In this article, I will critically examine the import and influence of 
his vast scholarship in nineteenth-century southern history, especially of his most 
significant book, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (1974). 
.  .  .  .  .   
 
Genovese began his career with a devastating critique of the South’s slave 
economy coupled with a flattering rendition of the “civilization” of the planter 
class. In his first book, The Political Economy of Slavery, published in 1965, 
Genovese argued that slavery had given rise to a distinct premodern, precapitalist 
society and had impaired the economic development of the South. According to 
him, the retarding effect of slavery on the southern economy became evident in 
the failure of the slave South to 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
industrialize and diversify its economy due to the subordination of town to 
country and the concomitant lack of a fully developed internal market. 
Plantation slavery’s central and determinative place and the comprador role of 
manufacturers and indus- trialists were a testament to the slaveholders’ 
hegemony. The inferior quality of the South’s livestock industry and the 
stillborn nature of southern agricultural reform illustrated the limits of 
economic development in a society dominated by slavery. The low 
productivity of slave labor, which, at this point, he attributed to the condi- tions 
of southern slavery rather than to the African identity and culture of the 
enslaved, further doomed the South to economic underdevelopment. The 
political economy of slavery was thus based on the dominance of the master 
class and char- acterized by the crises generated by its overwhelming reliance 
on slave labor. Faced with economic retardation and soil erosion, Genovese 
argued, slaveholders insisted on the expansion of slavery to the west and came 
headlong into confrontation with an equally expansive capitalist North, which 
inevitably led to secession and the Ameri- can Civil War.1 
Genovese’s economic indictment of slavery was infused with his sympathy 
for southern slaveholders as men responsible for the precapitalist, premodern 
social for- mation of the antebellum South, a supposed alternative to the 
triumphant march of capitalism in the Anglo-American world. Like many 
southern nationalists, he insisted on referring to the Civil War as the War for 
Southern Independence (pre- sumably independence for only white 
southerners). According to Genovese, the planter class, as good Hegelians, 
clung to slavery as the source of its political and cul- tural identity even though 
it was an unprofitable institution that made the slave South an economic 
backwater. Despite several asides on slaveholders’ ideology, psy- chology, and 
politics, and an interesting conclusion on their decision to secede, the main 
focus of the different essays that comprise The Political Economy of Slavery 
remained overwhelmingly economic and, as he later acknowledged, somewhat 
mechanistic. Genovese’s later works, rather than his first piece of scholarship, 
serve as better illustrations of his repudiation of his predecessors’ economic 
determinism and vulgar Marxism. 
Genovese overstated the notion that slavery was an economic drag for 
south- ern slaveholders in his eagerness to portray them as prebourgeois 
paternalists rather than profit-hungry capitalists. Slaveholders, he conceded, may 
have been acquisitive and prone to conspicuous consumption, but they were not 
motivated by profit max- imization. Despite the fact that several economic 
historians before and since have demonstrated convincingly that slavery was an 
enormously profitable institution for small and large slaveholders in the short 
term, Genovese’s insight, following Harold Woodman’s pathbreaking article 
showing that the use of slave labor hampered the long-term economic 
development of the South, still stands. His argument is certainly far more cogent 
than that of economic historians Stanley Engerman and Robert 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fogel, which portrays slavery as a progressive, capitalist institution.2 The slave 
South was predominantly agrarian and rural, and the place it occupied in the 
world market as a producer of raw materials smacked of dependency. Cotton, to 
reverse the boast of many antebellum slaveholders, was not king. 
Genovese’s arguments recast the old historical debate over the profitability 
of slavery into one that still shapes southern and U.S. history: Were slavery and the 
ante- bellum South capitalist, precapitalist, or even anticapitalist? Historians 
such as James Oakes and Robert Fogel, and more recently, Laurence Shore 
and Shearer Davis Bowman, have questioned Genovese’s formulation that 
modern racial slavery and capitalism, which is ideally based on free wage 
labor, were antithetical. They point out that plantation slavery constituted 
commercial agriculture as it involved the pro- duction of cash crops for the 
world market, thus very much making it a capitalist enterprise.3 
In answering his critics, Genovese, along with his wife, Elizabeth 
Fox- Genovese, came up with a more nuanced version of his initial position in the 
Fruits of Merchant Capital (1983). They argue that the slave South was in but 
not of the capitalist world and that relations of production (slave labor) rather 
than relations of exchange (the world market in which slaveholders participated) 
shaped the nature of antebellum southern society. Southern slavery was not 
feudal or seigneurial, even though it bore a certain resemblance to societies 
based on notions of lordship and bondage. Nor was it capitalist despite the fact 
that it involved the international trade of staple crops produced by slave labor. 
Merchant capitalism gave rise to archaic systems of labor such as racial 
slavery (and, one might add, the second serfdom of Eastern Europe), but it also 
created the world market and was responsible for the primitive accumulation of 
capital in the West, hence its “Janus faced” character. Moreover, merchant 
capitalism was conservative and parasitic in nature as it existed in premodern 
societies, such as the slave South, without leading to any qualitative economic 
change. Addressing the transition-from-feudalism-to-capitalism debate 
between Maurice Dobbs and Paul Sweezy, who argue over whether external or 
inter- nal forces led to the transformation to capitalism, the Genoveses come 
down heav- ily on the Dobbsian side. Commerce, they insist à la Marx, cannot 
be mistaken for capitalism.4 
Some of the Genoveses’ theoretical insights in the essays on merchant 
capi- talism and the slave economies provide valuable contributions to 
southern and Marxist historiography. The Old South, they conclude, gave rise 
to a distinct mode of production based on slavery that was neither feudal nor 
capitalist. However, they fail to explore fully the contradictions of this 
peculiar social formation, a society based on an archaic system of labor, which 
was nevertheless created and sustained by the expansion of capitalism in the 
West. In Genovese’s previous books, southern slaveholders and slave society 
appear as virtually ideal precapitalist types. Given the 
  
 
 
 
 
 
subtler and wide-ranging formulation in the Fruits of Merchant Capital, one 
should expect, even demand, a modified understanding of Genovese’s description 
of south- ern slavery. Genovese’s recent work on the slaveholders’ 
worldview admittedly proves more careful, but it still draws too firm a line 
between slaveholders’ allegedly antibourgeois conservatism and bourgeois 
conservatism. A modern slave society, as the Genoveses themselves point out all 
too briefly, is nothing if not a bastard forma- tion reeking of hybridity. 
Genovese’s ability to make bold and innovative interventions in long-
standing historical debates perhaps becomes most evident in his brief foray into 
the field of comparative slavery. At times, this comes at the cost of historical 
specificity and clar- ity. For instance, the first part of his second major work, The 
World the Slavehold- ers Made (1969), is a rather confused rendition of the 
seigneurial types of slavery in northeast Brazil and the antebellum U.S. South 
and the more capitalist-oriented slav- ery of the West Indies, Cuba, and the 
coffee plantations of southern Brazil. In his attempt to develop a systemic 
analysis of different kinds of slavery in the Western Hemisphere based on their 
relations to their mother countries and plantation man- agement, Genovese 
neglects the specific histories of these disparate areas, which makes his overall 
argument less comprehensible. In contrast, Genovese clarified the standards 
historians use when comparing North American slavery with Caribbean and 
Latin American slavery in a short but brilliant essay titled “The Treatment of 
Slaves in Different Countries: Problems in the Application of the 
Comparative Method.” We must distinguish between the material treatment of 
slaves, arguably better in the United States, with access to freedom and 
citizenship rights, and the social and cultural conditions of slaves, which many 
historians, starting with Frank Tannenbaum, used to portray Latin American 
slavery as more benign than its north- ern counterpart.5 Genovese’s article gives 
us points of comparison without the accompanying absurdity of designating 
racial slavery in any part of the Western Hemisphere as benevolent or “better.” 
Despite an initial and oft-quoted disclaimer that “slavery must be 
understood primarily as a class question and only secondarily as a race or a 
narrowly economic question,” Genovese develops a racial typology of New 
World slave societies based on class, caste, and “race relations,” or, rather, the 
strength of racism. Genovese states that racism was strongest in slave societies 
with a bourgeois orientation and an “Anglo-Saxon” Protestant heritage. He 
then goes on to argue that racism in the U.S. South, which presumably had a 
precapitalist slave society, became more virulent after the abolition of slavery. 
This might very well be true, but it also absolves the Old South too quickly of 
the brutal racialism that undergirded its two-caste slave society and that 
constituted its legacy for the postbellum era. Conventional wisdom 
notwithstanding, Genovese takes somewhat of a middle position in the ongoing 
race- versus-class controversy in southern history. He situates racism in the 
overall nature 
  
 
 
 
 
 
of a particular slave society and its class structure. In this sense, his understanding 
of “race” is historically contingent and more sophisticated than that of historians 
who argue that race wiped out class divisions in the slave South. Many of 
Genovese’s crit- ics, however, accused him of neglecting the racial component 
of modern slavery, a shared characteristic of all New World slave societies.6 
.  .  .  .  .   
 
Genovese, of course, is best known for his magnum opus on slavery in the 
Old South, Roll, Jordan, Roll, rather than for his work on comparative slavery. It is 
highly ironic that Genovese, who has been called a “Marx for the Master Class” 
and who makes no attempt to disguise his fondness for southern slaveholders, has 
written one of the most influential books on slaves and slave culture. Like many 
other historians who contributed to the renaissance in slavery studies in the 
1960s and 1970s, he sought to understand the lives, community, family, religion, 
and culture of the slaves. Despite emerging as one of the most penetrating 
scholars of slave culture, Genovese came to appreciate its richness relatively 
late and was probably influenced by the work of other historians such as George 
Rawick, Vincent Harding, Sterling Stuckey, and LeRoi Jones (Amiri Baraka). In 
an early essay, he had argued, with typical over- statement, that “slavery and its 
aftermath left the blacks in a state of acute economic and cultural backwardness, 
with weak family ties and the much-discussed matriar- chal preponderance,” and 
again that “slavery and its aftermath emasculated the black masses; they are 
today profoundly sick and shaking with convulsions.”7 Fortunately, Genovese 
revised these unresearched assessments of African American culture under 
slavery even though he retained the frameworks of nationalism and paternal- ism 
to understand slave culture and slavery, respectively. 
Genovese distinguished himself from other historians of slavery by 
situating his study of slaves in the master-slave relationship. In a trenchant 
critique of the “new social history” that encompassed slavery studies, he and 
Elizabeth Fox- Genovese condemned historians for studying the lower classes in 
isolation, for leav- ing politics out of the study of history, and for their uncritical 
borrowing of social sci- ence methods that produced static, ahistorical, and 
antiquarian histories. They insisted that history is “primarily the story of who 
rides whom and how,” updating the traditional Marxist assertion that class 
conflict is the motor force of history. The Genoveses argued that “radical-left” 
historians, unfairly lumped together with the bourgeois antiquarians and social 
science faddists, were guilty of glorifying the masses. These allegedly liberal 
historians in radical disguise stressed the autonomy of the social and cultural 
lives of the lower classes in order to make up for the paucity of serious political 
resistance among them.8 While the Genoveses’ point is well taken, Genovese 
himself owed much to these historians’ notion of culture as resistance, as his 
evocative discussion of slave culture in Roll, Jordan, Roll makes clear. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Like other scholars of the new social history of slavery, Genovese also 
sought to correct Stanley Elkins’s portrait of U.S. slavery as a closed, unchecked, 
vicious sys- tem of oppression that resembled Nazi concentration camps and 
psychologically emasculated its victims. Elkins had argued that the lack of strong 
institutions such as the state and church and a strong heritage of individualism 
and unrestrained capi- talism made slavery in the United States more 
exploitative than in any other part of the New World. Unlike slaves in Latin 
America, bereft of their African culture and exposed to a highly racist and 
oppressive form of slavery, slaves in the United States became imitative, servile 
“Sambos,” a slave personality type that Elkins claimed pre- dominated in the 
slave South. Interestingly, subsequent scholarship on naming prac- tices among 
southern slaves reveals Sambo to be the African name for a second son. Rich in 
psychological theory but lacking in virtually any primary historical research, 
Elkins’s thesis was attacked by a broad group of historians, who instead 
highlighted black cultural achievement under slavery. In fact, Elkins deserves 
credit for single- handedly inspiring modern scholarship on the lives and 
culture of slaves in U.S. history. 
But it was Genovese who came up with an alternative interpretive 
framework for understanding southern slavery. In a complete reversal of 
Elkins, Genovese argued that slaveholders’ precapitalist paternalist ideology 
allowed room for the growth of a vibrant slave culture and in material terms 
produced the least harsh form of slavery. But the slaves’ cultural survival 
extracted a heavy price from them as they were forced to accommodate to 
slaveholders’ paternalism and therefore failed to develop a tradition of 
revolutionary resistance to slavery. Unfortunately, the Elkins- Genovese 
dichotomy has presented historians of U.S. slavery with a Hobson’s choice. We 
either accept Elkins’s view of slavery as a totalitarian institution and the con- 
comitant one-dimensional and ahistorical picture of all slaves as imitative 
“Sambos,” or we follow Genovese’s paternalism thesis if we want to stress 
the creation of African American culture under slavery.9 
In Roll, Jordan, Roll, Genovese defined paternalism as a set of 
mutual responsibilities or duties and customary “rights” for masters and slaves, 
unlike rela- tions between employers and workers in a capitalist society 
governed by an imper- sonal cash nexus. Genovese did not argue that 
paternalism did not involve exploita- tion or brutality or that it made slavery a 
benign institution. But he did imply that the relationship between master and 
slave mediated by a sense of personal responsibil- ity was less harsh than 
capitalist relations and openly admired various facets of slave- holders’ 
paternalism that allowed and even encouraged the formation of black fam- ilies 
and culture. According to Genovese, paternalism bound masters and slaves in a 
mutual web of obligations and rights and helped slaves to assert their humanity 
in a system that negated it, albeit as inferior dependents. It also enabled 
masters to ameliorate the worst excesses of slavery and see their slaves as part 
of their families 
  
 
 
 
 
 
and households. A resident planter class and the relatively early prohibition of 
the African slave trade in 1808 accentuated southern slaveholders’ paternalism 
because it encouraged a personal relationship between master and slave and 
because it com- pelled slaveholders to pay attention to the reproduction of their 
slave labor force.10 For Genovese’s numerous critics, paternalism simply 
constitutes the latest version of the southern moonlight-and-magnolias myth of 
slavery given academic respectability by U. B. Phillips, one of the first serious 
historians of slavery but an apologist for the institution and an overt racist to 
boot. The fact that Genovese owes his thesis of paternalism to Phillips and has 
made no attempt to disguise his admi- ration for Phillips has, of course, 
confirmed this assessment in the minds of many. While Genovese’s paternalism 
thesis offers a far more theoretically sophisticated ren- dering of the master-slave 
relationship and is shorn of Phillips’ blatant racism, he does reiterate many of 
the latter’s conclusions on the nature of southern slavery. Some of Genovese’s 
terms of comparison, such as correlating the conditions of the working poor in 
England with those of southern slaves — a case of comparing apples with oranges, 
some would say— are those of slaveholders and southern defenders of slavery. 
There are no known instances of wageworkers, no matter how degraded their 
condition, selling themselves and their posterity into slavery. Perhaps the 
biggest problem with Genovese’s interpretation is that it takes what is 
prescriptive and what he admits is a “self-serving” class ideology seeking to 
rationalize and legit- imize slavery, as descriptive of the institution’s reality. 
Ideology, of course, forms a 
part of historical reality, but it is nonetheless one version of it.11 
Genovese’s paternalism thesis is hence closely linked to his notion of 
the slaveholders’ ideological and cultural hegemony. Well versed in the 
traditions of Marxism, Genovese was influenced by theorists such as the 
great Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and the British school of neo-Marxist 
scholars including Eric Hobsbawm, Christopher Hill, Raymond Williams, and 
E. P. Thompson, all of whom rejected reductionist versions of Marxism that 
emphasized the primacy of the eco- nomic and instead argued for the importance 
of studying ideology, culture, and class consciousness. Gramsci had developed 
the notion of hegemony, or the ideological domination of the bourgeoisie in 
Western civil society through seemingly inde- pendent institutions, to 
complement and complicate the orthodox Marxist under- standing of the 
bourgeois control of production and the state. Genovese deserves credit for 
introducing the concept of hegemony to American historiography: he 
employed it to characterize the rule of the planter class in the slave South in his 
early writings, and it underlay his interpretive framework in Roll, Jordan, Roll. 
But his use of hegemony makes far more sense in the context of white society, 
even though the slave South was institutionally underdeveloped when compared 
to modern Western democracies, than it does for that of the slaves. The 
pervasiveness of proslavery sen- timents among church leaders, newspaper 
editors, and politicians gives ample proof 
  
 
 
 
 
 
of slaveholders’ ideological and political domination in the Old South. And 
even here, the limits of slaveholders’ hegemony in nonplantation areas of the 
region, espe- cially in the upper South, are evident.12 
On the other hand, the blatantly coercive nature of slavery and the slaves’ 
rel- ative isolation from the political and public world makes Gramsci’s concept 
of hege- mony at best tenuous in explaining the master-slave relationship. In a 
chapter on the hegemonic function of slave law, Genovese therefore argues that 
Southern courts were forced to acknowledge the humanity of slaves despite 
their meager and non- existent rights in the formal law codes of the South. 
While Genovese, following Willie Lee Rose’s notion of the “domestication” of 
antebellum slavery, is certainly right to point out that most southern states did 
away with the barbaric excesses of the colonial slave codes except during slave 
insurrection scares, the legal disabilities that slaves faced remained severe. 
“Equality before the law,” a legal fiction that encapsu- lates the hegemonic 
function of law in bourgeois society, has no parallel in slave law, which ensured 
the opposite, and the instances of procedural fairness for slaves and light 
punishment of whites accused of slaves’ murder hardly provide an equivalent. 
For example, the rape of a slave woman did not exist in southern legislation, with 
the exception of a law passed in Mississippi as late as 1860 which made the 
rape of a black female child a punishable offence and under which no cases 
were ever prose- cuted. And it was not the protection of the law but the strict 
subordination of slav- ery that made mob violence in the antebellum South 
unnecessary, with exceptions again occurring in particular historical 
moments, such as the aftermath of Nat Turner’s rebellion. 
Genovese introduces paternalism to correct the blatant deficiencies of 
south- ern law in this respect. According to him, the “dual function” of slave 
law included a realm outside legislation — individual slaveholders’ paternalism, 
the appeal to pub- lic opinion that condemned brutality toward slaves, and a host 
of “customary rights” that slaves claimed thanks to the Faustian bargain they 
had struck with slaveholder paternalism. For instance, he argues that many 
slaveholders, and especially their children, taught slaves to read and write in 
defiance of the law, though historians estimate that barely 5 percent of the 
slave population was literate on the eve of emancipation.13 Only if we accept 
Genovese’s claim that slaves accommodated to slaveholders’ paternalism to 
create a livable world for themselves can we accept his argument for the latter’s 
ideological hegemony over the former. 
Without a doubt, Genovese’s discussion of slave life and culture in Roll, 
Jor- dan, Roll is the most extensive to date. Widely researched but also wide-
ranging in its use of theorists, philosophers, black intellectuals, and activists to 
prove a point or move an argument along, Genovese’s book, however much one 
may disagree with its interpretive schema, must be seen as a tremendous 
achievement of historical schol- arship and imagination. Genovese evokes the 
daily texture and feel of slave life like 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
few other scholars on slavery do, and his descriptions of soul food, celebrations, 
and harvest times have a literary quality that not many historians can match. At 
the same time, we can accuse Genovese of presenting us with a rather romantic 
view of slav- ery in these chapters, a tendency that he has criticized in the 
works of other radical historians. While Genovese’s extended analysis of the 
black work ethic is original to him, his examination of the black family, 
language, and naming practices builds on the work of his colleagues and reaches 
the same conclusions. 
At various points, however, Genovese’s study of slave culture is 
hampered, rather than facilitated, by the author’s attempt to fit it within his 
paternalist frame- work. For example, Genovese’s initial attempt to argue that 
slaves identified with the “aristocratic” ethos of slaveholders and their “white 
folks” is not very convincing. The ideas of paternalism and slaveholders’ 
ideological hegemony, which apparently tied slaves as individuals to their 
masters and hampered collective solidarity, exist in uneasy tension with 
descriptions of slave culture and a worldview that allowed slaves to limit the 
oppressions of slavery and question the legitimacy of their enslavement. This 
tension becomes most apparent in his brief and contradictory conclusion to the 
book: “By developing a sense of moral worth and by asserting rights, the slaves 
trans- formed their acquiescence in paternalism into a rejection of slavery itself, 
although their masters assumed acquiescence in the one to demonstrate 
acquiescence in the other.” And this tension cannot be reconciled by the dialectic 
of accommodation and resistance that Genovese presents to us because, for 
him, slaves’ resistance was confined to the conditions of slavery, while their 
accommodation was to paternalism as a whole, an ideology that justified 
slavery. Here thesis (accommodation) and antithesis (resistance) do not make 
a synthesis, and no dialectical Aufhebung (reso- lution) emerges as thesis 
submerges antithesis.14 
This tension becomes even more apparent in Genovese’s occasional use 
of a nationalist interpretation to understand slave culture. In fact, the 
unproblematic and uninvestigated coexistence of slaveholder paternalism and 
black nationalism in the book makes little sense, since the latter should surely 
have nullified or severely lim- ited the effects of the former. To attribute a sense 
of nationalism to the slaves implies independence and autonomy in slave 
culture, much more so than detailed descrip- tions of slave culture and family 
do. Many critics have charged that Genovese here either suffers from an acute 
case of historical presentism (he was writing during the Black Power or black 
nationalist phase of the civil rights movement) or that the asides on 
nationalism exist merely to deflect potential black criticisms of the book. 
Genovese has only himself to blame for these accusations because the brief parts 
on nationalism in the book have a “tagged-on” quality about them. Unlike 
paternalism, the nationalist nature of slave culture is not analyzed thoroughly or 
followed through in the book’s various arguments. Here Genovese is guilty 
of the same lapse he accuses other scholars of, the failure to develop the “black-
nationalist interpretation 
  
 
 
 
 
 
of the black experience in the United States.” He misses a golden opportunity 
to come up with a cogent analysis of the political and ideological nature of slave 
culture and to reevaluate his broader argument on the extent to which slaves 
accommodated to paternalism. This becomes clear during the aptly termed 
“moment of truth” in the Civil War when slaveholders were forced to confront 
their slaves’ utter rejection of slavery and their much-vaunted paternalism. But 
here, after some telling examples of the slaveholders’ world turned upside down, 
Genovese’s argument quickly degen- erates into a recounting of the apparently 
many more instances of slave loyalty and identification with “white folk” and 
the “Big House.” Proximity to Union army lines and risks involved in running 
away, rather than any sense of loyalty to their “white folks,” probably guided 
the behavior of seemingly loyal slaves.15 
The strengths and problems in Genovese’s examination of slave 
culture become most evident in his rightly acclaimed section on African 
American Chris- tianity. Religion lies at the heart of the book and of the world the 
slaves made. Inter- spersed with quotations from the Bible, Roll, Jordan, Roll 
has a biblical or at least a grand church history quality to it. Genovese places his 
discussion of black religion in the context of the history of Christianity, cutting an 
impressive swath across Western history. His discussion of syncretism in slave 
religion of the Western Hemisphere, of Obeah, Myalism, and Vodun, remains 
without a peer in U.S. history. His careful examination of the process of 
African American conversion in the South, of African Americans’ creation of a 
“folk religion” based on strong African spiritual ante- cedents, the place of 
conjure in black religion, the style of worship, funeral practices, and the role of 
the black preacher make the book one of the best examinations we have of 
African American Christianity under slavery. Along with Albert Raboteau, 
Vincent Harding (who unlike Genovese stresses the revolutionary potential 
of African American Christianity), and Sterling Stuckey (who drew attention 
to the African ring shout and who, unlike Genovese, questions the extent of 
slaves’ Chris- tianization), Genovese is responsible for revealing the centrality 
of the black reli- gious experience under slavery. 
However, Genovese’s most valuable insight that Christianity imparted to 
the slaves a “protonational black consciousness” or a “black nationalist 
sensibility” remains unexplored even in the chapter titled “Religious 
Foundations of the Black Nation” ostensibly devoted to this idea. Instead, the 
essentially apolitical and non- revolutionary nature of black Christianity and 
its accommodation to slaveholder paternalism frame his analysis and 
conclusions on slave religion. Genovese argues that while black Christianity 
gave slaves an alternative sense of self-worth and a way to resist the 
dehumanization of slavery, it lacked a prophetic, messianic, and millen- nial 
tradition and therefore could not act as a revolutionary ideology. Southern slaves 
developed a salvationist rather than a retributive understanding of Christianity. 
The life-affirming, “this worldly” nature of their African religious heritage led 
slaves to 
  
 
 
 
 
 
reject notions of original sin and asceticism that may have engendered a 
revolution- ary Christianity. Theologically, as John Jentz has pointed out, no 
necessary connec- tion between the two exists. Indeed, one could argue that 
liberation theology in Cen- tral America contained tenets similar to those held 
by the slaves— an identification with the suffering of Jesus and a belief in the 
spiritual superiority of the poor. Gen- ovese presents little evidence for his 
assertions that African American Christianity lacked a millennial and 
prophetic tradition. In fact, he spends considerable time explaining away the 
prophet Nat Turner, the slaves’ longing for a Moses-like messiah (Moses was 
alternatively Jesus or a white deliverer like Lincoln instead of a black 
revolutionary like Turner), their sense of themselves as the chosen people, 
the children of Israel, and their millennial conception of emancipation as 
the Day of Jubilo.16 Perhaps African American Christianity, like Western 
Christianity as a whole, encompassed accommodation to the social order and 
revolutionary resistance at different historical moments. It is Genovese’s 
attempt to deny any element of political resistance to African American 
Christianity that seems troubling and rings hollow after his perceptive though 
somewhat dualistic discussion of the Christian tradition. 
Genovese’s reliance on paternalism and the concept of the slaveholders’ 
ide- ological hegemony over their slaves is most problematic when it comes to 
his argu- ments on slave resistance. While he is undoubtedly correct in stating 
that the slave South did not witness the large and numerous slave revolts that 
shook other slave societies in the Western Hemisphere, this fact perhaps had far 
more to do with the objective conditions on the ground — as Genovese points 
out here and in his some- what underestimated but valuable book on slave revolts, 
From Rebellion to Revolu- tion: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the Making of 
the New World (1979)— than with the slaveholders’ hegemony. It hardly comes 
as a surprise that slave societies with large black majorities and plantations 
counting over a thousand slaves each would produce bigger and more frequent 
slave revolts than a slave society with an armed white majority, more moderate 
slaveholding units, and a smaller black pop- ulation. Genovese clearly 
acknowledges this, but he then goes on to use the fre- quency and size of 
slave revolts to buttress his argument about slaves’ accommoda- tion to 
slaveholder paternalism in the Old South. It is in his later book on slave 
revolts and marronage that Genovese once again blazes a new path in 
historical interpretation by looking at the “restorationist” quality of slave 
revolts before the Haitian Revolution and their “revolutionary” quality 
thereafter. His typology of slave revolts by goals and ideology still offers the 
most cogent model we have for under- standing slave rebellions in the Western 
Hemisphere today. Building on the work of the great C. L. R. James, he reminds 
us in the book’s inspired afterword that slaves, rather than slaveholders, were 
the true exemplars of the Age of Revolution and the radical egalitarianism he 
has come to deplore of late.17 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The section on slave resistance in Roll, Jordan, Roll, by contrast, 
remains mired in paternalism and some debatable conclusions. In analyzing 
lesser forms of slave opposition, such as day-to-day resistance to slavery, lying, 
stealing, dissembling, deliberately breaking tools, and hurting livestock, 
Genovese characterizes them as “apolitical” and “prepolitical” forms of 
resistance possibly accommodationist in nature as they acted as an outlet for 
slave discontent without challenging the system of slavery. Even if we accept 
Genovese’s characterization of the prepolitical nature of individual acts of 
resistance, it does not follow that these actions merely constitute a kind of 
accommodationism that has no significance in the long history of resis- tance. 
As some recent scholars have pointed out, small acts of resistance tend to 
build solidarity in an oppressed group or class, preparing them for larger acts 
should the opportunity arise. And acts like stealing, which fed into the slave 
South’s under- ground black economy, commanded the attention of southern 
state legislatures due to their potential for political subversion. Even more 
susceptible to criticism is Gen- ovese’s highly questionable claim that slaves felt 
demeaned by their own behavior because they accepted slaveholders’ standards 
of morality. As good Christians, Gen- ovese asserts, slaves saw stealing from and 
lying to their masters as immoral behav- ior. The argument that slaves may have 
had their own notions of moral economy and an alternative set of values does not 
impress him. Here, the idea of the slaveholders’ cultural hegemony over the 
slaves certainly carries Genovese beyond the limits of scholarly discretion and 
into a sort of psychohistory that historical evidence hardly supports.18 
And while Genovese offers full-bodied and original descriptions of 
preachers, slave drivers and foremen, “mammies,” and house slaves, the slave 
rebels, resisters and runaways are dismissed as merely nihilistic, 
individualistic, and destructive of the slaveholding community’s norms in a 
one-sided portrait. Genovese also views running away, perhaps the most 
ubiquitous form of slave resistance in the South, as draining away instigators of 
potential slave rebellions, missing what one historian has called its “political 
significance.” Presumably, without slave runaways, there would have been no 
fugitive slave controversy between the North and South, an important stepping-
stone to the Civil War, nor black abolitionists of the caliber of Frederick 
Douglass. Fugitive slaves, Charles Sumner once said, were the “true heroes of 
our age.” And during the Civil War, slave runaways forced the Lincoln 
administration to address the issue of slavery and together with northern 
abolitionists and radical republicans, hurried the president and the North along 
the road to emancipation. The political import of running away both before and 
during the Civil War was noth- ing short of the complete destruction of slavery.19 
Genovese’s questioning of the political nature of black resistance 
extends even to slavery’s aftermath. According to him, the severe lessons in 
dependence and paternalism imbibed by slaves under slavery compromised their 
ability to develop an 
  
 
 
 
 
 
effective political leadership after the Civil War. Not until the twentieth century 
did a truly independent African American leadership emerge, he claims. 
Subsequent work on Reconstruction has demonstrated quite the opposite. The 
quick rise of inde- pendent black politics during Reconstruction leads us to 
question the extent to which slaves ever accepted the paternalist bargain. 
Indeed, as perhaps the most con- sistent and avid adherents to the tenets of 
American republicanism, former slaves revealed the complexity of the black 
political tradition in the nineteenth century, which encompassed not only their 
protonationalism but also the radicalism of West- ern revolutionary ideology that 
slave rebels, northern free blacks, and abolitionists had evoked in their struggle 
against slavery.20 
An examination of the reception of Genovese’s masterpiece in the 
scholarly community suggests an interesting paradox. While reviewers and 
critics have pointed to numerous flaws in his study, Roll, Jordan, Roll remains 
the most influen- tial synthetic work on southern slavery. Historians of slavery 
have taken issue with Genovese for not paying sufficient attention to change 
over time and regional dif- ferences within the South, for drawing most of his 
evidence from the large planta- tions on the South Atlantic seaboard, for virtually 
ignoring the nonslaveholding yeo- man majority, for failing to examine the 
importance of the domestic slave trade, for ignoring the racial dimension of 
southern slavery, and most tellingly, for slighting the importance of the use of 
force and compulsion in slavery. Whippings, as Genovese also admits, remained 
ubiquitous on southern plantations and farms, and, one could add, they 
constituted the most unambiguous symbol of slave status in southern soci- ety. In 
a reply to his critics, Genovese admits a “weakness in the presentation” of his 
arguments that might have misled readers to assume that he “underestimate[d] 
the terrible burden which slavery imposed.”21 
Recent scholarship on slavery seems to be chipping away at the 
paternalism thesis. One historian has questioned paternalism as an adequate 
interpretive frame- work for understanding slavery by drawing attention to the 
high rates of slave mor- tality in the rice areas, where absenteeism among 
planters was common. Paradoxi- cally, this is the area from which Genovese 
drew much of his data. The most influential book on slave culture today, 
Michael Gomez’s Exchanging Our Country Marks, emphasizes its African 
antecedents and rejects paternalism as a viable inter- pretive framework for 
understanding black religion and culture. Similarly, new work on gender and 
slavery and the extent of sexual abuse suffered by slave women, which Genovese 
also discussed, calls into question his notion of slaveholder paternalism. Few 
women’s historians have followed his lead in characterizing these relations as, at 
times, “seduction” and “loving.” Indeed, intimacy and personal contact with the 
mas- ter might have aggravated rather than ameliorated the oppressions of 
bondage for some slave women.22 
Books on the interstate slave trade and its dimensions cast a serious 
shadow 
  
 
 
 
 
 
over Genovese’s paternalism argument. More than any other single fact, the 
selling away of over 1 million slaves during the antebellum era from the older 
seaboard slave states to the southwest, and more in other “local” sales, vitiates 
the idea of paternal- ism. Genovese and some other historians of slavery proved 
far too enamored of slaveholders’ legendary disdain for slave traders and their 
occasional efforts to avoid breaking up slave families to fully comprehend the 
extent and significance of the domestic slave trade, which mirrored the 
abuses of the African slave trade. Ira Berlin’s recent survey of southern 
slavery argues that this “Second Middle Passage shredded the planters’ 
paternalist pretenses in the eyes of black people and prodded slaves and free 
people of color to create a host of oppositional ideologies and insti- tutions that 
better accounted for the realities of endless deportations, expulsions and flights 
that continually remade their world.”23 
But no scholar has offered an alternative theoretical framework to 
compre- hend southern slavery since Genovese published his work nearly three 
decades ago. Most historians today, with a few notable exceptions, emphasize 
the local and con- tingent in understanding the nature of slavery instead of 
attempting to write a new synthesis on southern slavery. In fact, one of the most 
influential survey textbooks on southern slavery restates Genovese’s paternalism 
thesis by arguing that the relatively small slaveholdings of the antebellum South 
bred a peculiarly intimate and intrusive form of paternalism, and it goes a step 
further than he in questioning the slaves’ abil- ity to form truly autonomous 
communities and culture. Genovese’s paternalism is that of the large planter, one 
that allowed room for the development of slave culture and families. Peter 
Kolchin’s paternalist is typically a small resident slaveholder whose ever-
present intrusion seriously undermined slaves’ cultural and personal space. In 
either case, it is highly unlikely that southern slaveholders, except perhaps for 
very small slaveholding farmers who typically owned less than five slaves and 
worked alongside them, “knew” their field hands and their personal 
characteristics in the way that they knew their house servants or favored slaves. 
Genovese, of course, relied on evidence from large plantations to prove his case 
for paternalism, and it is difficult to believe that most large planters, some of 
whom owned more than one plantation, had intimate knowledge of a vast 
majority of their slaves, which might have engendered a sense of personal 
responsibility. While paternalism might describe aspects of slaveholders’ 
relationships with house servants, slave drivers, and some skilled slaves, it 
probably did not include the field hands who performed the hard, backbreaking 
agricultural work of plantation slavery.24 
.  .  .  .  .   
 
Of late, Genovese shows more interest in uncovering and analyzing the thought 
of proslavery writers, thinkers, and clergymen than in the world of the slaves, 
which he describes as a “detour in my lifelong special project,” the history of the 
slaveholders. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Genovese’s fascination with the mind of the master class and with the defense 
of slavery can be traced back to his essay on George Fitzhugh, the Virginian 
proslav- ery ideologue, in The World the Slaveholders Made. Genovese’s essay 
heralded the arrival of historical scholarship on proslavery thought, a body of 
literature that had lain long forgotten and discredited as unworthy of serious 
intellectual attention. His analysis rescued Fitzhugh and the proslavery 
argument from historical obscurity. Genovese did not see Fitzhugh as a 
representative figure among defenders of slav- ery but as the most “advanced” 
in developing the premises of proslavery thought. Hence, while concentrating 
on Fitzhugh, Genovese convincingly illustrated the con- servative nature of 
proslavery thought, its rejection of revolutionary ideology and the legacy of the 
Enlightenment, and its critique of liberalism and democracy. He force- fully 
argued for the distinctive and conservative nature of southern thought, which he 
saw as a product of slave society and its exigencies. 
However, Genovese’s attempt to magnify into a full-blown critique of 
capi- talism Fitzhugh’s comparison of the conditions of the working classes in 
the free North and especially in England during the Industrial Revolution with 
the allegedly better material conditions of the slaves, a favorite tactic among 
southern defenders of slavery, is questionable. To categorize Fitzhugh’s thought 
as feudal socialism or to argue that he advocated the overthrow of capitalism as 
an economic system goes too far. It is a classic bourgeois mistake to lump the 
extreme right with the left when ide- ologically the two positions are poles 
apart, as Genovese recognizes. But he reads into Fitzhugh an anticapitalist 
posture, which comes close to the same political and intellectual error. 
Fitzhugh and many proslavery southerners certainly argued that slavery 
con- stituted the best system of labor and that it solved the inevitable conflict 
between capital and labor by aligning the interest of the master with the welfare 
of the slave. But as true conservatives, they abhorred working-class activism, 
and Fitzhugh even recommended the enslavement of white workers to achieve 
de jure what capitalism did de facto. He and those who shared his ideas saw 
abolition as akin to socialism and advocated an alliance with northern 
conservatives to keep abolition, labor, and all forms of radicalism in check. 
Genovese of course deals with this argument, but for him, in the end, it does 
not compromise the allegedly anticapitalist thrust of Fitzhugh’s thought. 
After the Civil War, Fitzhugh would become an eager proponent of capitalism.25 
I would refrain from even seeing Fitzhugh and his proslavery cohorts as 
any sort of anticapitalists. While these men, and a few women, delighted in 
describing in great detail the misery of the working classes, their fear of labor 
radicalism and rad- ical democracy outweighed their alleged sympathy for the 
plight of workers. None of them advocated the overthrow of capitalism, and 
many saw northern capitalists, and not the working classes, as their natural 
allies. And this was not a matter of expedi- 
  
 
 
 
 
 
ency, but a natural corollary to the inherently reactionary and antidemocratic 
nature of their thought. In short, they were more antidemocratic than 
anticapitalist. Like Arno Mayer’s never-fading European aristocracy, they could 
always be found on the side of political reaction. Moreover, southern 
slaveholders were not as ideologically consistent as we would imagine. They did 
not hesitate to advocate bourgeois notions such as the right to property as long 
as it supported their commitment to bound labor. If anything, they saw the 
defense of slavery as part of the defense of all prop- erty and capital. Post–Civil 
War business magnates and economic thinkers in indus- trializing America 
would borrow a leaf from slaveholders’ ideology in arguing for the subordination 
of labor and the restriction of political democracy.26 And as the history of the 
transformation to capitalism in the Western world and in the rest of the world 
reveals, the growth of a market economy and the expansion of political democracy 
do not prove as compatible in practice as in bourgeois theory. Indeed, the 
contradictory relationship between capitalism and democracy continues to 
unfold on a global scale today. 
While Genovese’s insights into the precapitalist characteristics of 
southern slave society prove valuable, we must view his argument that southern 
slaveholders’ ideology was essentially anticapitalist as an exaggeration. He 
has even taken Marx and Engels to task for assuming a “liberal stance” in 
failing to appreciate the anti- capitalist nature of the slave South and for 
supporting the Union cause during the Civil War. Apparently, we need to admire 
slaveholders because they were “class con- scious, socially responsible, and 
personally honorable; they selflessly fulfilled their duties and did what their 
class and society required from them.” Marxist scholars, on the other hand, 
“suffer from their passionate commitment to the cause of Negro lib- eration and 
from their hatred of slavery.” But by supporting the Union effort and the Lincoln 
administration, Marx was not inadvertently supporting a bourgeois cause, as 
Genovese implies; he supported what he appropriately also saw as a 
workingman’s fight. There could be no socialism in America, Marx felt, as long 
as part of the work- ing class remained enslaved. As far as slavery and the Civil 
War are concerned, one may, with qualifications, accept Genovese’s history— 
but give us Marx’s politics any day. 
We can criticize some older Marxist scholars and Marx himself for 
their unquestioning faith in a progressive history. Certainly, it led Marx to 
commit some errors in judgment, as in his grudging praise for the introduction of 
capitalism to the “backward” areas of the world by British imperialism or his 
construction of a non- existent Asiatic mode of production. Interestingly 
enough, Genovese has recently endorsed Marx’s position in this respect, arguing 
that “Western imperialism spurred the only genuine social revolutions that 
Asia had ever experienced,” a naive ob- servation that should arouse 
considerable surprise among most Asian historians. Genovese has always been 
more critical of radical historians and thinkers such   as 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Staughton Lynd and Herbert Aptheker, for which he has expressed some 
genuine contrition, than of the work of southern conservatives such as Phillips, 
and of late, Lewis Simpson, Richard Weaver, and M. E. Bradford.27 
If some Marxist historians are guilty of “the insipid glorification” of 
the masses, as Genovese charges, then we can certainly hold him accountable for 
roman- ticizing the slaveholding class of the Old South and their political and 
ideological heirs, southern conservatives. Genovese’s recent work, which 
repeatedly argues for the intellectual and political superiority of proslavery 
writers and thinkers and the southern conservative tradition, veers sharply in this 
direction. Genovese believes it possible to resurrect southern conservatism as a 
viable political and intellectual tra- dition despite its historically tainted image 
derived from its complicity with slavery and racism. If Genovese’s attempt to 
argue for a southern tradition divorced from racism and married to the cause of 
black nationalism— a tradition that would fight the alienation and atomization 
that is the social legacy of market capitalism— is heroic (if not downright 
Quixotic), it might also be horribly out of sync with today’s political realities. 
As the backbone of the Republican Party today, southern conservatism 
has helped solidify the rule of the very market economy Genovese deplores but 
now credits for the economic success of capitalism. Rather than the gross 
inequalities of the market and the rapacious nature of corporate capitalism, he 
decries “market society,” the so-called bourgeois culture of radical democracy, 
personal fulfillment, and individual rights. Like many conservatives, Genovese 
is now drawn to a politics of cultural conservatism combined with a 
newfound respect for the economic achievements of capitalism. Invoking the 
South’s legacy of states rights, even though it has been associated with the 
defense of slavery and segregation, he rails against government “centralization,” 
the only counterweight the most vulnerable sections of our society have against 
corporate power. One wonders what Genovese would offer as a solution to the 
corporate crime wave that has engulfed the United States under the aegis of 
Republicans and a motley crew of religious and economic conservatives. But it is 
the “crimes of the left,” by which he means the fallen communist countries of 
Eastern Europe, and not the crimes of the right, that provoke Genovese, who was 
once accused of being soft on Stalin. Genovese now admonishes the left to take 
reli- gion, by which he means Christianity, more seriously.28 
One need not disagree with Genovese’s political views to note a 
substantial difference between the creativity and vigor of his early scholarship 
and his contem- porary work. It is perhaps too early to judge his recent 
scholarship, as we have only suggestive essays to date that will culminate in 
the publication of his next major book, The Mind of the Master Class, to be 
coauthored with his wife, Fox-Genovese. The best of his recent book-length 
publications, which contains his lectures and some of his articles, is a slender 
volume, The Slaveholders’ Dilemma (1992),  that 
  
 
 
 
 
 
vividly describes the permanent tension of a slave society caught in the throes 
of a modern world. Genovese views antebellum southern thinkers as attempting 
to solve this dilemma by developing their own vision of progress and 
modernity based on slavery and the conservative principles of slave society. 
Here, Genovese’s work seems to converge with that of his principal critic, James 
Oakes. In his latest book, Oakes argues that southern slaveholders’ dilemma 
remained an unsolvable one since they could neither fully reject nor entirely 
assimilate the political liberalism of their world. In analyzing the thought of 
antebellum southern thinkers and clergymen such as James Henley Thornwell, 
James Henry Hammond, Thomas Roderick Dew, William Henry Trescot, 
Henry Hughes, Albert Taylor Bledsoe, and Benjamin Mor- gan Palmer, to name 
a few, Genovese is developing a systematic intellectual biogra- phy of 
proslavery southerners, whom he portrays as articulating the slaveholders’ 
mindset. His work, along with that of Michael O’Brien and Drew Gilpin Faust, 
has drawn attention to the study of antebellum southern intellectual history and, 
in the case of Genovese, particularly the study of southern theology.29 
In numerous articles, the Genoveses have argued that religion lay as 
much at the center of the slaveholders’ worldview as it did for the slaves. In 
this area, Gen- ovese’s scholarship sometimes turns vindicationist to a fault. He 
has argued in several places that slaveholders “won” the religious controversy 
over slavery against aboli- tionists because the Bible clearly sanctions slavery. 
If we accept that scriptural fun- damentalism and biblical literalism are the 
highest form of theological inquiry, then Genovese is certainly correct. He has 
proclaimed his own adherence to conservative theology against more liberal 
interpretations, to the “word” of the Bible versus its “spirit.” But Genovese, as 
he himself admits, wants to have his cake and eat it too. It seems that the 
theologically conservative proslavery ministers, like their secular 
counterparts, were also progressive reformers. In A Consuming Fire (1998), 
Gen- ovese takes his view of the progressive nature of proslavery Christianity 
as far as it can possibly go by drawing attention to southern clergymen’s 
advocacy of the reform of southern slavery, of the legalization of slave 
marriages and families, and of slave literacy. As Genovese points out, most of 
these men sought to correct abuses in slav- ery and to bring it closer to their 
notions of Christian stewardship. Apparently, southern white ministers 
concerned about African Americans’ “incapacity” to com- pete in the 
marketplace were convinced that emancipation would result in the extinction 
of the black “race.”30 Nevertheless, these efforts at reform also reveal how much 
southern slavery would have to change before any effective defense of it could be 
mounted. The ministers’ paternalist concern for the alleged black inability to 
compete in the marketplace reveals a smug, self-interested racism. And even 
after all the inculcation in the Christian duties of masters, many of these 
clergymen suc- cumbed a little too easily to the virulent racism of the 
postbellum era. 
Genovese is too good a historian not to counterpose his generally  positive 
  
 
 
 
 
 
assessment of proslavery Christianity with the slaves’ viewpoint. As he 
tellingly quotes one black woman, “What white folks did to black folks in 
slavery times, they won’t ever be able to pray it away.” The “juxtaposition” of 
this woman’s “unanswer- able indictment” and “the slaveholders’ remarkable 
achievement,” he says, was the “genuine tragedy of the Old South.” One can only 
hope that he will develop this jux- taposition more than he has so far and give as 
much room to the slaves’ indictment as to the slaveholders’ worldview in his 
future studies. He might also pay heed to Frederick Douglass, who, writing of 
his own experience under slavery, reserved his greatest disdain for a “pious” 
master, a Methodist class leader who “found religious sanction and support for 
his slaveholding cruelty.” As Douglass memorably wrote, 
I am filled with unutterable loathing when I contemplate the religious pomp 
and show, together with the horrible inconsistencies, which everywhere 
surround me. We have men-stealers for ministers, women whippers for 
missionaries, and cradle-plunderers for church members. The man who 
wields the blood clotted cowskin during the week fills the pulpit on Sunday, 
and claims to be a minister of the meek and lowly Jesus. . . . The slave 
auctioneer’s bell and the church-going bell chime in with each other, and the 
bitter cries of the heart broken slave are drowned in religious shouts of his 
pious master. Revivals of religion and revivals of the slave-trade go hand in 
hand together.31 
 
Perhaps Genovese has to bear in mind his own admonition. A study of 
slaveholders, just as a study of the slaves, must be imbedded in the master-slave 
relationship. One wishes that his very overt new political preferences will not 
completely subvert his scholarly commitment to dialectics. 
For better or for worse, historians of southern history have to grapple 
with Genovese’s scholarship. His analysis of the nature of slave society and 
African Amer- ican culture and religion has greatly enriched southern 
historiography. He has been, no doubt, one of the boldest and most original and 
insightful historians of slavery and the Old South. Will his forthcoming book on 
the mind of the slaveholders prove a fitting capstone to a long and distinguished 
career? Does Genovese’s recent repu- diation of communism, one that many 
Marxist scholars have long done, also imply a change in his commitment to 
historical materialism, a commitment that led him to produce some of the most 
provocative works in southern and African American history? Or will his 
questionable fondness for the champions of human bondage and for southern 
conservatives, which seems to grow instead of dissipating, hamper rather 
than further his astute scholarship? 
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